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Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging
International Human Rights Norms?
The Challenge of “Defamation of Religion”
Robert C. Blitt*
I. INTRODUCTION: DRAFTING A BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
¶1

The decision to draft a bill of rights heralds a momentous event in any
country’s history. In the latter half of the 20th century, crafting a document that addresses
the fundamental rights of individuals and groups and their relationship to the state has
typically involved a flurry of public consultations, negotiations, drafting, and rewrites.
Increasingly, however, such endeavors remain incomplete without some effort to
observe, understand, and account for comparative trends related to human rights on the
international level as well as in other states. Although writing about constitutions
specifically, A.E. Dick Howard’s observations are equally relevant to standalone bills of
rights:
The international human rights revolution has had undeniable impact upon
comparative constitutionalism. It is hard to imagine drafters of a new
constitution going about their task unconcerned about human rights
standards … For half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights has served as a model for constitution makers. Countless
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constitutions written since 1948 contain guarantees that either mirror or
draw upon the Declaration.1

¶2

¶3

Numerous examples across a wide range of states confirm this tilt in favor of
consulting international norms.2 Recent drafting efforts in Iraq,3 Afghanistan,4 New
Zealand,5 South Africa,6 and all the states of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact7
leap to mind, to name but a few. In each of these cases – and with varying degrees of
success – national drafters held their country’s unique cultural, historical, and political
experiences up against the collective database of international experiences to divine
commonalities, mutual priorities, shared aspirations, and points of divergence. Although
no bright line rule has emerged requiring states drafting new bills of rights to undertake
such a comparative assessment or import wholesale the standards contained in the major
international human rights instruments, the pattern of consultation and endorsement is
undeniable and may even signal an emerging international customary norm.8 Indeed, in
the past, the European Union has made diplomatic recognition of states conditional on
their willingness to pledge respect for human rights and provide legal “guarantees for the
rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities.”9
Along this line of reasoning, a further issue arises as to whether established
international standards represent the normative ceiling or only the floor. Should states
1 A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler From An Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative
Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 18 (2009).
2 The majority of these states integrated bills of rights into their new constitutional documents. New
Zealand focused exclusively on drafting a standalone bill of rights, a process currently being contemplated
by Australia.
3 Though ultimately deleted from Iraq’s 2005 constitution, a draft version contained a provision that would
have explicitly provided individuals “the rights contained in international human rights agreements to
which Iraq is a party as long as those rights did not contradict the provisions of the constitution.” Ashley S.
Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 32 (2007).
The final constitutional text specifies that Iraq “shall observe the principles of good neighborliness…and
respect its international obligations.” IRAQ CONST., 2005, art. 8.
4 Afghanistan’s constitution requires the state to “abide by the UN charter, international treaties,
international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
Afg. CONST., 2004, art. 7.
5 New Zealand’s 1990 Bill of Rights stipulates that one of its purposes is “[t]o affirm New Zealand’s
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990, 1990 Public Act No. 109 (N.Z.).
6 It is widely acknowledged that South Africa’s constitution drafting process borrowed from international
treaties, national constitutions and international and foreign jurisprudence. Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of
Constitutional Borrowings On the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human
Rights Provisions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 177 (1998).
7 In central and eastern Europe generally, international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), was “universally
perceived” as one of the most important sources of human rights used for modeling new constitutional
regulations. Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights In New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 111, 161 (1994).
8 This paper is limited to exploring the relevancy of one possible emerging international human rights norm
on the bill of rights dialogue unfolding in Australia. The larger question of whether states may be obligated
to incorporate international human rights standards under customary international law when drafting a bill
of rights is set aside for another occasion.
9 Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union,” Dec. 16, 1991, 31 ILM 1485, 1487 (1992).
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engaged in a bill of rights drafting process aspire to adopt not only minimalist existing
norms but also emerging ones that arguably embody the natural normative extension of
human rights but have yet to become entrenched? As Jacek Kurczewski and Barry
Sullivan point out, the notion of minimum standards in human rights law “dialectically
entails as well the notion of something more demanding than the minimum – that is, the
possible expansion of rights to which people are entitled.”10 From this perspective, many
additional questions follow: How much further should a state go? What is the
international status of cutting-edge issues such as intersex and transsexual rights, the right
to an adequate standard of living,11 and migrant rights? What, if anything, should a newly
drafted bill of rights say on these issues?
At least in part, these questions can be addressed procedurally within the
discussion over whether the bill of rights will be a succinctly worded statement that takes
a general approach, or a longer document that engages specificities. Substantively,
however, drafters also have a duty to inform themselves of what, if any, emerging human
rights issues are relevant, and how they should be addressed.
Using this understanding as a point of departure, the following article posits
that beginning the arduous task of drafting a bill of rights from a standpoint of openness
toward comparativism and engagement with international norms affords the process
several advantages. First, it informs the public at large that the discussion over the nature
and scope of rights does not occur in the vacuum of domestic politics alone, but rather
implicates larger ideas relevant to humanity as a whole.12 Second, it allows a state the
ability to consciously check any drafted domestic standards against its pre-existing
international obligations under treaty or customary law. This in turn affords drafters an
opportunity from the outset to furnish clear answers for basic questions such as whether
international or regional human rights treaty obligations will be directly enforceable on
the municipal level. Even where existing treaty rights are determined to be nonjusticiable, drafters can still test to what extent proposed domestic standards measure up
against international norms.13 Finally, exploring comparative and international
experiences situates the debate in a broader context that is necessarily more diverse, more
informative, and more comprehensive. By plugging into this fecund ideascape, drafters
can build up a robust domestic understanding of the content of rights and their related
limitations, the dynamics of public-private and individual-group relationships, and the
10

Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 259 (2002).
11 The National Human Rights Consultation Report has recommended that “if economic and social rights
are listed in a federal Human Rights Act, those rights not be justiciable and that complaints be heard by the
Australian Human Rights Commission.” NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION, NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT (Sept. 30, 2009), at xxxv,
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Report_NationalHumanRightsCon
sultationReportDownloads#pdf (hereinafter NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT).
12 By this, I simply mean that the experience of one state’s drafting process and final instrument may in the
future help inform the drafting process of the next state contemplating a new or revised bill of rights.
13 This advantage resonates with the Australian Human Rights Commission’s existing mandate, which
includes “making human rights values part of everyday life and language” and “keeping government
accountable to national and international human rights standards.” About the Commission, AUSTRALIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
Australia’s federal parliament established the Commission (formerly the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission) in 1986 as an independent statutory body that reports to Parliament through the
Attorney-General.
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existing mechanisms for balancing competing interests where inevitable conflicts may
arise. Related to this, exploring comparative and international sources affords the benefit
of alerting drafters to emerging rights or norms that otherwise might not figure in the
domestic debate, providing additional opportunity to tweak the proposed language.
Ultimately, such efforts – although more time-consuming and complex – can challenge
pre-existing ideas and limitations, resulting in a more vibrant drafting process and more
thoroughly “beta-tested” final product.
With these advantages in mind, the following article considers the emerging
norm of “defamation of religion” – one recent flashpoint in the international human rights
dialogue – in the context of Australia’s bill of rights drafting process. Incorporating an
earnest assessment of comparative experiences and benchmarks into a bill of rights
drafting process is a natural and worthy step for the government of Australia, particularly
in light of the country’s long history of international engagement14 and its ongoing
commitment to international human rights.15 This approach also respects the stated desire
of many Australians to ensure their government “protect[s] and promote[s] all the human
rights reflected in its obligations under international human rights law.”16 Indeed, the
Australian government has identified the advancement of human rights as every nation’s
responsibility: “[T]he function of government is to safeguard the dignity and rights of
individuals, whose lives should be free of violence, discrimination, vilification, and
hatred. … [W]e do not rest on our laurels. We continue to strive to protect and promote
human rights and to address disadvantage.”17

14

For example, H. V. Evatt, an Australian, served as President of the UN General Assembly during the
adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Australia was an original
signatory to that Declaration. Doc Evatt: A brilliant & Controversial Character, THE EVATT FOUNDATION,
http://evatt.labor.net.au/about_evatt/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
15 In the words of the Australian government: “Australia’s commitment to the aims and purposes of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects our national values and is an underlying principle of
Australia’s engagement with the international community.” Australia: Seeking Human Rights for All,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/hr/hr_for_all.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2010). Australia is a state party to all but two of the nine main human rights treaties. It regularly reports
to each of the bodies responsible for overseeing the implementation of these treaties. OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR) - REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE
PACIFIC, RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: ADDED VALUE FOR THE PACIFIC REGION
15 (2009), available at http://pacific.ohchr.org/docs/RatificationBook.pdf. Australia has not signed or
ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, which entered into force on July 1, 2003. As of November 2010, this treaty had mustered
only 44 state parties. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no western or central European state
has ratified the treaty; Serbia is the only other European signatory to the convention. International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families,
adopted Dec. 18, 1990, 45 U.N.T.S. 158, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en.
Australia also has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance. This treaty has not yet entered into force because it lacks the minimum number of state
parties; twenty ratifications are required, only 19 have been secured to date (status as at: November 11,
2010). International Convention for the Protection of All persons from Enforced Disappearance, opened for
signature Dec. 20, 2006 61 U.N.T.S. 488,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&lang=en.
16 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 73.
17 Human Rights, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT,
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Humanrightsandanti-discrimination_Humanrights (last
visited Oct. 11, 2010) (emphasis added).
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Given this firm commitment to an expansive understanding of rights,
Australia can and should aspire to adopt not only minimalist existing norms but the
emerging ones that embody the natural normative extension of human rights. Indeed, as
the Law Council of Australia suggested during the recently completed National Human
Rights Consultation process, “Australia should actively engage with the process of
developing new human rights principles through its interaction with international human
rights bodies.”18 Obviously, this responsibility doesn’t begin and end with the
international bodies. Rather, it logically entails that Australia adopt the same position vis
à vis the process of developing new human rights principles on the home front as well.
This said, the notion of defamation of religion poses a challenge to the
presumed desire to incorporate and strengthen domestic and international human rights
regimes. As will be argued below, this putative norm has the effect of attenuating rather
than reinforcing the traditional scope of freedom of expression and freedom of religion or
belief. Yet it has consistently garnered strong support on the international level and
therefore may be trending in the direction of an emerging customary norm. Faced with
this possibility, the question arises as to whether Australia’s bill of rights process should
account for defamation of religion, and if so, how.
In the next section, I offer a brief comparative history of the offense of
blasphemy to help contextualize the intended meaning of defamation of religion. The
third part of this article discusses how defamation of religion became the focus of dozens
of United Nations (UN) resolutions, assesses the challenges associated with grafting the
legal concept of defamation onto the mercurial notion of religion and its potential
implications for existing international law, and finally takes stock of the ongoing debate
as it stands today. The fourth part of this article draws some preliminary conclusions
concerning the possible impact of enforcing a norm against defamation of religion, and
addresses to what extent—if at all—Australia should incorporate a response to this
emerging norm in any future bill of rights.
II. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY: A FOUNDATION FOR
UNDERSTANDING DEFAMATION OF RELIGION
A. Blasphemy in the West

¶10

In theological terms, blasphemy is equated with “a direct criticism of God
and sacred objects.”19 The legal definition of blasphemy “developed historically to meet
various, primarily political rather than religious, perceptions of a need for the law to
protect institutions, originally the State itself.”20 In other words, the challenge posed by
alleged heretics and blasphemers represented nothing less than an act of state treason
threatening the very foundation of a society held together with the brick and mortar of an
exclusive religious conviction.21 The state could level blasphemy-related charges against
18

NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 72.
Reid Mortensen, Blasphemy In A Secular State: A Pardonable Sin?, 17 U.N.S.W.L.J. 409, at 409 (1994).
20 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT-APPENDIX 3:
BLASPHEMY Para. 7 (2003), http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/9515.htm.
21 For example, in recognizing blasphemy as a common law offense in 17th century England, the court held
that “to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved,
19
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an individual to protect the social or ideological underpinnings of society, or more
specifically, use such charges to “suppress the expression of religious beliefs or opinions”
that the dominant group believed to be false.22 As U.S. Justice Felix Frankfurter famously
observed, “Blasphemy was the chameleon phrase which meant the criticism of whatever
the ruling authority of the moment established as orthodox religious doctrine.”23
¶11
In many states today, the offenses of blasphemy and heresy are viewed as
antiquated tools for protecting a given ruler’s religious worldview at the expense of all
other differing opinions. Indeed, as religion and state gradually decoupled in the west,24
charges of blasphemy grew more infrequent. While prosecutions for blasphemy in the
United States became “no more frequent than the sightings of snarks,”25 the common law
offense persisted in England until its abolition in 2008.26 Prior to this, UK courts
concluded that blasphemy required little in the way of intent,27 could result in a sentence
of hard labor,28 and only operated to protect the Church of England and its specific

and that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to
speak in subversion of the law.” R v. Taylor, 1 Vent. 293 (1676); 86 Eng. Rep 189 (K.B.). In this brief
quote, the court made plain the linkage between safeguarding the dominant faith and preserving the social
and political order of the day.
22
Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law,
1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 251, 289 (1999). Consequently, any nonconformist criticism of the dominant
church—whether real or perceived—was not only dangerous, but considered “necessarily wrong when
emanating from inferior subjects against their masters.” LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
5 (1985).
23
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 529 (1952).
24 This trend may be linked to broader conditions of modernity leading to the secularization of society,
wherein religion “becomes increasingly a private concern of the individual and thus loses much of its
public relevance and influence.” Riaz Hassan, Expressions of religiosity and blasphemy in modern
societies, NEGOTIATING THE SACRED: BLASPHEMY AND SACRILEGE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 119
(Elizabeth Burns Coleman & Kevin White eds.) (2006).
25
LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD x (1981) (referring to LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF
THE SNARK: AN AGONY IN EIGHT FITS (1876)).
26
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Section 79 (2008) (Eng.),
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080004_en_1. The 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act
arguably prohibits some acts that may have previously constituted blasphemy, however its provisions apply
equally to all religions. Part 3A of the 2006 Act addresses “[h]atred against persons on religious grounds.”
Under Section 29B(1), “[a] person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written
material which is threatening, is guilty of an offense if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred.” The
term “religious hatred” is defined as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious
belief or lack of religious belief.” In addition to the offense requiring the impugned communication to
constitute a threat, Section 29J provides detailed protection for freedom of expression:
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts
discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular
religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the
beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion
or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060001_en_1. The
issue of incitement is discussed at greater length below.
27 In 1979, the House of Lords affirmed a minimal threshold of intent for the offense of blasphemy,
endorsing the trial judge’s direction that “guilt of the offence of publishing a blasphemous libel did not
depend on the accused having an intent to blaspheme, but that it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove
that the publication had been intentional and that the matter published was blasphemous.” R. v. Lemon
(Denis), [1979] A.C. 617, 618 (also known as Whitehouse v. Lemon).
28 William Gott, the last individual in the UK sentenced to a prison term for blasphemy, served nine months
hard labor for distributing pamphlets describing Jesus Christ entering Jerusalem “like a circus clown on the
back of two donkeys.” [1922] 16 CR. APP. R. 87, 89.
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doctrines rather than all religious beliefs.29 In other states where blasphemy was not
abolished outright, alleged violations were left unprosecuted or became unenforceable
“either through stricter intent requirements or judicial attempts to strike a balance
between conflicting rights.”30
¶12
In Australia, the last successful prosecution for blasphemy occurred in
31
1871. The 1990s ushered in an era of renewed interest related to the common law
offense of blasphemy, in part triggered by the Salman Rushdie affair in the United
Kingdom.32 In 1991, the New South Wales (NSW) parliament requested that the Law
Reform Commission explore “whether the present law relating to the offence of
blasphemy is adequate and appropriate to current conditions.”33 In undertaking its
mandate, the Commission acknowledged two key questions: first, “whether the offence
[of blasphemy] is anachronistic in a modern society … which is multicultural, pluralistic,
and secular, and maintains a strict separation between Church and State”; and second,
“whether the offence of blasphemy improperly impinges upon the fundamental right of
freedom of speech.”34 Because the offense of blasphemy had not been successfully
prosecuted in over a century, the Commission also observed that there was “a real
question whether blasphemy still exists in the criminal law of New South Wales, even if
it was ‘received’ as law in colonial times.”35
¶13
As part of its findings, the Commission identified “several pieces of
legislation in New South Wales … [that] assume[d] the existence of the crime” despite
uncertainties regarding its reception from England.36 Surveying the status of blasphemy
in Australia’s other states and territories, the Commission also found that apart from
section 574 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), only the Tasmanian Criminal Code
contained another express statutory reference to blasphemy.37 In contrast, other
Australian jurisdictions had either abolished the offense altogether or maintained it only
as a common law crime.
¶14
After weighing various options regarding the common law offense of
blasphemy, including retention, progressive codification, selective replacement, and
outright abolition, the Commission endorsed abolition without a substitute offense as the
best option for NSW.38 The Commission’s recommendation stemmed from the status of
29

In Choudhury v. UK (1991) 12 HRLJ 172, members of Britain’s Muslim community sought
unsuccessfully to prosecute author Salman Rushdie for allegedly blaspheming against Islam in his novel,
THE SATANIC VERSES; see also Q & A: Blasphemy law, BBC NEWS, Oct. 18, 2004,
http://news.bbe.c.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3753408.stm.
30
Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 303, 354
(2008). For example, Germany’s criminal code forbids insulting religion publicly or by dissemination of
publications. However, successful prosecution requires “the manner and content” of the insult to rise to
such a level that an objective onlooker could reasonably conclude it would disturb the peace of those
targeted. Id. at 355-56.
31 R v. Jones (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court Quarter Sessions, Simpson J, 1871) (Austl.),
in Butterworths, 23 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF AUSTRALIA 365, 695 (1996).
32 Siddique & Hayat, supra note 29.
33 NSW Blasphemy Report, 74 Terms of Reference, available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R74TOR [hereinafter NSW Blasphemy Report].
34 Id. ch. 1, ¶¶ 1.2-1.3.
35 Id. ¶ 1.4.
36 Id. ch. 2, ¶ 2.14.
37 Id. ch. 3, ¶ 3.2.
38 Id. ch. 4, ¶¶ 4.3, 4.81.
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the offense in NSW, its finding that there had been “no prosecutions for blasphemy in
other Australian states, Scotland, Ireland, New Zealand or other comparable jurisdictions
for over 50 years, and … the fact that every law reform commission which [had]
considered blasphemy law reform … recommended abolition of the offence.”39 As a
potential alternative, the Commission also found that anti-discrimination statutes were:
better designed to preserve public order and social cohesion in a modern
democratic society, given several important considerations: the emphasis
on education and conciliation in the first instance; the clarity of the
elements of the offences, and the protection of debate or discussion carried
out in good faith; the more realistic penalties; and the requirement of the
consent of the Attorney General before criminal proceedings may be
instituted.40
¶15

On the federal level, Australia’s early legislation revealed several efforts to
enforce anti-blasphemy measures, particularly in literature, television, and film.41
However, in 1992, a federal Law Reform Commission recommended that: “All
references to blasphemy in federal legislation … be removed. Offences that protect
personal and religious sensibilities should be recast in terms of ‘offensive material.’”42
This recommendation stemmed from the Commission’s opposition to extending the law
of blasphemy for the purpose of covering religions other than Christianity. In the
Commission’s view it “would be very difficult to devise a satisfactory definition of
religion [to encompass faiths other than Christianity] and would be an unreasonable
interference with freedom of expression” to perpetuate the offense of blasphemy.43 In the
wake of these findings, Australia’s federal government acted to repeal much of the
legislation containing blasphemy-related offenses.44
¶16
More recently, in the “Piss Christ” case,45 Melbourne’s Catholic Archdiocese
sought an injunction against the display of an allegedly blasphemous photograph by artist
Andres Serrano. The photo, to be exhibited at the National Gallery of Victoria, depicted a
crucified Jesus Christ which the artist had immersed in urine. The Supreme Court of
Victoria, noting that there was “no evidence … of any unrest of any kind following or
likely to follow the showing of the photograph in question,” held against the plaintiff, and
also stated the need to contextualize the dispute with “regard to contemporary standards
39

Id. ¶ 4.80.
Id. ¶ 4.31.
41 Id. ch. 3, ¶ 3.12.
42Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, ALRC Report 57, Chapter 7, ¶ 7.59
(1992).
43 Id. ¶ 7.59.
44 The Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act of 1995 repealed the previous
Customs (Cinematograph Films) Regulations of the Commonwealth. The prohibition against blasphemous
works or articles contained in the 1956 Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations was discarded by an
amendment. Likewise, section 118 of the Broadcasting Act 1942, prohibiting the broadcast of blasphemous
material, was similarly excised by virtue of being replaced with the Broadcasting Services (Transitional
Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1992.
45 Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria (1998) 2 V.R. 391, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/1997/52.html. For a discussion of this case, see Bede Harris,
Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria: Should Blasphemy Be A Crime? The ‘Piss
Christ’ Case and Freedom of Expression, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217.
40
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in a multicultural, partly secular and largely tolerant, if not permissive, society.”46 The
Court concluded that if it were to “grant the relief sought by the plaintiff, [it] might
thereby use the force of the law to prevent that which, by the same law, is lawful.”47
B. Blasphemy in Muslim States
¶17

As noted above, blasphemy at its origin represented an ecclesiastical offense.
In the Christian west, government implementation and enforcement of blasphemy laws
through the common law often protected only specific iterations of the Christian faith.
All other comers – including Muslims, Jews, and Hindus – had no means of bringing the
wrath of the law to bear against the perceived disparagement of their respective religions.
¶18
Governments in the Muslim world similarly sought to outlaw offenses
equivalent to blasphemous conduct. Authorities invoked religious or statutory law to
impose a variety of penalties against blasphemy, apostasy, and other related acts.48 Like
their western counterparts, these offenses49 also shared a clearly identifiable connection
with notions of treason or sedition against the state. This resulted in part due to the
absence of any bright line separation between religion and state under the banner of
Islam.50 As Cherif Bassiouni has remarked, Islam provides a “holistic conception of life,
government, law and hereafter. There is no division of church and state; there is no
division between matters temporal and religious, and between different aspects of law.”51
¶19
While the current trend in the West indicates a tendency to discard
blasphemy offenses into the trash bin of history,52 there appears to be no parallel
movement within Muslim states. For example, in Pakistan, a declared Islamic state,53
existing blasphemy laws continue to result in miscarriages of justice and “exacerbate a
growing environment of dogma and intolerance – spawning a culture of extremism and
violence.”54 The United States Department of State has observed that Pakistani
46

Pell, (1998) 2 V.R. 391.
Id.
48 See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights Law, and
the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375, and Perry S. Smith, Speak No Evil:
Apostasy, Blasphemy and Heresy in Malaysian Syariah Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 357.
49
Although no exact offense parallel to the Judeo-Christian offense of blasphemy exists under Islam,
insulting God, Mohammed or any other aspect of divine revelation amounts to an offense under Sharia. See
Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WIILJ 349, 351-352. The
article provides a long list of examples of blasphemy-type offenses prosecuted in the Muslim world. See
also Hassan, supra note 24.
50
See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS, 167-68 (4th ed.
2007), and Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and Contemporary
Islamic Law in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 387 (Johan
D. van der Vyver and John Witte, eds., 1996).
51
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, Speech, Religious Discrimination, and
Blasphemy, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Proceedings (Apr. 7, 1989) in 83
ASILPROC 427, 433.
52 An exception to this trend is evident in Ireland’s recently passed Defamation Bill, which includes
provisions covering the offense of blasphemy. See infra Part IV.
53 For a closer examination of how the constitutional systems of Muslim states address religion-state
relations, see Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of
Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim
Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947 (2005).
54
Siddique & Hayat, supra note 30, at 384. For example, consider the 14-year imprisonment of a mentally
ill woman suspected of blasphemy and the Pakistani government’s failure to protect the Ahmadi
47
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authorities “routinely use[] the blasphemy laws to harass religious minorities and
vulnerable Muslims and to settle personal scores or business rivalries.”55 Most recently,
gunmen in Pakistan’s Punjab province shot and killed two Christian brothers as they
returned to prison after a court appearance on blasphemy charges,56 and several other
Christians faced jail sentences57 for violating Pakistan’s Penal Code ordinances against
blasphemy. Under the Code, any individual who “directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred
name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” is subject to “death, or imprisonment for life.”58
¶20
In Malaysia, the federal constitution declares Islam as the official religion,
but authorizes states rather than the federal government to legislate in the area of Islamic
law.59 Within the Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan), Part III of
the Syariah [Sharia] Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 enumerates
“Offences Relating to the Sanctity of the Religion of Islam and its Institution,” which
include “[i]nsulting, or bringing into contempt … the religion of Islam.”60
¶21
This Act also proscribes “acts in contempt of religious authority” and
“def[ying], disobey[ing] or disput[ing] the orders or directions [of the Majlis Agama
Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Federal Territory Islamic Council)] expressed or given by

community, as well as its lackadaisical response in the face of violence targeting that community. See
Mubasher Bukhari, Pakistan Court Frees Mentally Ill Blasphemy Suspect After 14 Years, REUTERS FAITH
WORLD (Jul. 22, 2010) http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2010/07/23/pakistan-court-frees-mentally-illblasphemy-suspect-after-14-years/; Attackers Target Lahore’s Ahmadi Worshippers; 70 Dead, DAWN, May
29, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-contentlibrary/dawn/news/pakistan/metropolitan/04-lahore-blasts-qs-07.
55 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2009 (Oct. 26, 2009). During the
previous reporting period, Pakistani “authorities arrested at least 25 Ahmadis, 11 Christians, and 17
Muslims on blasphemy charges.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm.; see also infra text accompanying note 77.
56 Fareed Khan, On Trial for Blasphemy, Two Christian Brothers Murdered in Faisalabad, ASIA NEWS
(Jul. 19, 2010, 5:58 PM), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/On-trial-for-blasphemy,-two-Christian-brothersmurdered-in-Faisalabad-18977.html; see infra text accompanying note 77.
57 See, e.g., Fareed Khan, Karachi, A Christian Sentenced to Life Imprisonment for Blasphemy, ASIA NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Karachi,-a-Christian-sentenced-to-lifeimprisonment-for-blasphemy-17749.html; Brian Sharma, Pakistan’s ‘Blasphemy’ Laws Claim 3 More
Christians, THE CHRISTIAN POST (Mar. 11, 2010, 9:17 AM),
http://www.christianpost.com/article/20100311/pakistan-s-blasphemy-laws-claim-three-morechristians/index.html.
58 See Art. 295-C, PAK. PENAL CODE (Act XLV of 1860). The code also establishes punishments for other
blasphemy-related offenses including “[d]eliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious
feelings” and against anyone who “defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an.” See Arts.
295-A and 295-B, PAK. PENAL CODE (Act XLV of 1860).
59 Under Art. 3(1) of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, “Islam is the religion of the Federation.” However,
List II of the Constitution assigns significant legislative powers to the states pertaining to Islam (with
certain limitations), including the creation and punishment of offences against precepts of Islam, as well as
the constitution, organization and procedure of Sharia courts. Malay. CONST., 1994, arts. 3(1), 367
(incorporating all amendments up to August 1994).
60
Article 7 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 provides:
7. Any person who orally or in writing or by visible representation or in any other manner—
(a) insults or brings into contempt the religion of Islam;
(b) derides, apes or ridicules the practices or ceremonies relating to the religion of Islam; or
(c) degrades or brings into contempt any law relating to the religion of Islam for the time being in force
in the Federal Territories . . .
SYARIAH CRIMINAL OFFENCES (FEDERAL TERRITORIES) ACT 1997 §7, ACT 559, LAWS OF MALAYSIA
(2006). For an overview of the situation related to blasphemy in Malaysia, see Smith, supra note 48.
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way of fatwa . . .”61 Upon conviction of either insulting Islam or defying an Islamic
Council fatwa (a decision based on Islamic law), an individual is liable for a fine, prison
sentence of up to two years, or both.62 According to the Administration of Islamic Law
(Federal Territories) Act 1993, once a fatwa is issued by the Islamic Council and
published in the official Gazette, it gains the status of enforceable law in the Federal
Territories.63 In turn, such fatwas are binding on every Muslim resident in the Federal
Territories, each of whom is obligated by a “religious duty to abide by and uphold the
fatwa . . .”64 The Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 further
mandates that all courts in the Federal Territories recognize gazetted fatwas “as
authoritative of all matters laid down therein.”65 Even in the event that a fatwa is not
published, at least one former high-level government advisor has contended that the
ruling demands respect as a religious decree.66
¶22
The influence of Malaysia’s various fatwa councils is far-reaching. On the
federal level, the National Fatwa Council, a body intended to harmonize state-issued
fatwas, has sought to prohibit Muslims from practicing yoga on the grounds that it risked
“destroy[ing] a Muslim’s faith,”67 ban the “unacceptable” practice of women “dressing in
the clothes men wear,”68 and prohibit exhibitions concerning ghosts.69 In a similar vein,
the Islamic Religious Council in the central state of Selangor threatened to sue the
Malaysian Bar Association for using the word “Allah” on its website.70
¶23
In Indonesia, where the constitution is silent with regard to favoring
secularism or Islam, the government actively invokes criminal ordinances to prosecute
alleged blasphemy-related offenses. Under the Criminal Code, publicly “giving
expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against one or more groups of the
61

Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 §9, Act 559, Laws of Malaysia (2006).
Id. §§ 7, 9.
63 ADMINISTRATION OF ISLAMIC LAW (FEDERAL TERRITORIES) ACT 1993 § 34(3), Act 505, LAWS OF
MALAYSIA (2006).
64 Id. According to Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman, a prime ministerial adviser on religious affairs, “The
National Fatwa Council has been entrusted to deliberate on [questions of Islamic law] in depth and come
out with edicts on them. And in an evolved world like ours … such a council plays an important role in
providing ‘guidelines’ for these grey areas to Muslims.” Hariati Azizan, In a Twist Over Fatwa Ruling, THE
STAR ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/30/focus/2683235.
65 ACT 1993, supra note 63.
66 Azizan, supra note 64.
67 Niluksi Koswanage, Muslims Warned to Avoid Blasphemous Yoga, WELT ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2008),
http://www.welt.de/english-news/article2766685/Muslims-warned-to-avoid-blasphemous-yoga.html; see
also Robin Brant, Malaysia Clerics Issue Yoga Fatwa, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7743312.stm. Ultimately, Malaysia’s Prime Minister intervened to
assure Muslims that yoga was still permissible, despite the fatwa’s stated prohibition. Malaysia Backs
Down From Yoga Ban Amid Backlash, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AP2CA20081126.
68 Malaysian Religious Council Issues Ban on Lesbian Sex, AFP, Oct. 23, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5izKo_RKkF40cfljjibbi3Yai-5Tw.
69 According to the National Fatwa Council chair, the decision was taken to avoid undermining the faith of
Muslims by exposing them “to supernatural and superstitious beliefs.” Malaysia Issues Fatwa on Ghosts,
AL JAZEERA (Apr. 13, 2007), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asiapacific/2007/04/200852513106697452.html.
70 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Malaysia: Legal Body Faces Lawsuit for Using Word ‘Allah,’
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM NEWS BLOG, (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://becketinternational.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/malaysia-legal-body-faces-lawsuit-for-using-word%E2%80%98allah%E2%80%99/.
62
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population of Indonesia,” is punishable by a maximum imprisonment of four years or a
fine.71 While the Indonesian law is admirable for its attempt to move away from
protecting the majority faith exclusively, the U.S. Department of State has concluded that
enforcement actions in practice “have almost always involved blasphemy and heresy
against Islam.”72 Human Rights Watch likewise has concluded, “Indonesian laws
prohibiting blasphemy are primarily applied to practices perceived to deviate from
mainstream Islam.”73 Blasphemy charges have been invoked in a variety of situations,
including an art exhibit containing photographic representations of fig leaf-covered Adam
and Eve,74 and against various individuals claiming to be reincarnations of the Prophet
Muhammad75 and the archangel Gabriel,76 among others. On a much broader scale, the
government has severely restricted and even banned certain activities of the Ahmadi
community,77 including public religious worship, as part of a clamp-down pattern
targeting groups deemed “heretical,” “deviant,” or heterodox.78 Following Malaysia’s
lead, Indonesia’s Ulema Council issued a similar fatwa prohibiting Muslims from
practicing yoga for fear it might corrupt their faith.79
¶24
From this brief overview – and in contrast to the present situation in most
Western countries – snark sightings remain quite a common occurrence in the Muslim
world. Many Muslim states continue to shield Islam from even minor criticism, and in
certain instances use anti-blasphemy measures as an offensive tool to stifle the free
exercise of religious belief for minority faiths and Muslim dissidents alike. As illustrated,
such practices are not exclusive to religious regimes but rather may be observed across
the spectrum of Muslim constitutional models – including in states that make no
declaration regarding Islam as the official religion.80 It is from this milieu that the
71 PENAL CODE OF INDONESIA arts. 156-56(a), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html. For
the purpose of these provisions, the term “group” is defined as a sector of the population that is
distinguished by “race, country of origin, religion, origin, descent, nationality or constitutional condition.”
Id.
72 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2008 (2008). The State Department
report notes dozens of individuals charged and convicted under Indonesia’s criminal code. Id.
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009 261 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.
74 Indonesia: Blasphemy case against Adam and Eve photo exhibit, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 3,
2006, available at http://religion.info/english/articles/article_227.shtml.
75 Peter Gelling, Indonesia Bans Sects It Deems Blasphemous, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/world/asia/16indo.html.
76 Andra Wisnu, Lia Eden sentenced to prison, again, THE JAKARTA POST, June 3, 2009,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/03/lia-eden-sentenced-prison-again.html.
77 The primary differentiation between Ahmadis and Muslims relates to the Ahmadi belief in the
prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (founder of the Ahmadiyya faith). Recognition of this designation
by Ahmadis contravenes the basic teaching under Islam that Mohammed was the final prophet. However,
Ahmadis consider themselves devout Muslims faithful to the teachings of Islam. See M. Nadeem Ahmad
Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community
in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 275, 279-82 (1995-96); see also Amjad Mahmood Khan, Persecution of the
Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217 (2002-03).
78 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 171 (2009), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/final%20ar2009%20with%20cover.pdf.
79 Niniek Karmini, Indonesian Muslims Banned From Practicing Yoga, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.kilil5.com/news/19970_indonesian-muslims-banned-from-p.
80 Because of space constraints, examples on anti-blasphemy measures in Turkey, a declared secular
Muslim state, have been omitted. See Robert C. Blitt, The Bottom Up Journey of 'Defamation of Religion'
from Muslim States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas
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movement to prohibit “defamation of religion” (originally expressed in the more specific
and decidedly less ecumenical slogan “defamation of Islam”) emerged a decade ago to
begin its journey in search of international legitimacy.
III. DEFAMATION OF RELIGION: BLASPHEMY GOES INTERNATIONAL
A. Origins of Defamation of Religion at the United Nations
¶25

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), whose fifty-seven
member states represent “the collective voice of the Muslim world,”81 is responsible for
spearheading the effort to secure international condemnation of acts deemed defamatory
of religion – and more precisely, defamatory of Islam. In addition to its own reporting
and resolutions on the issue,82 the OIC – working through its individual member states –
has focused for the past ten years on adding the creation of a norm prohibiting
defamation of religion to the agendas of various UN bodies. The first step in this effort
came in 1999 when Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, submitted a draft resolution
entitled “Defamation of Islam” to the now defunct Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR).83 This proposed resolution sought to combat perceived negative international
media coverage of “Islam as a religion hostile to human rights.”84 In the view of
Pakistan’s UN ambassador, this negative media coverage amounted to a “defamation
compaign [sic]” against the religion and its adherents to which the UNCHR had to
react.85 The draft of the resolution sought to have the UNCHR both express “concern at
the … spread [of] intolerance against Islam,”86 and call upon the Special Rapporteur on

(Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 132, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1729783. Despite the apparent unity in governmental
approach across all four Muslim constitutional systems, recent sociological data on blasphemy hints at the
possibility that differentiation may exist among the citizenry of these states, with public opinion more
closely mirroring the expectation that declared secular states would demonstrate little interest in upholding
blasphemy-related offenses while their more religious counterparts tend towards favoring such laws. See
Hassan, supra note 24.
81 About OIC, ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, http://www.oicoci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52 (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
82 For a more detailed account of these activities, see Blitt, supra note 80.
83 The first reference to defamation of Islam at the UN may be traced back to 1997. In reaction to a report
addressing “Islamist and Arab Anti-Semitism” prepared by the UN Special Rapporteur on racism,
Indonesia’s ambassador alleged “‘defamation of our religion Islam and blasphemy against its Holy Book
Qur’an.’” Rene Wadlow and David Littman, Blasphemy at the United Nations?, IV MIDDLE EAST
QUARTERLY 4, 85-86 (1997), available at http://www.meforum.org/379/blasphemy-at-the-united-nations.
The UNCHR responded by adopting a consensus decision—supported by the United States and several
other Western countries, which expressed “indignation and protest at the content of such an offensive
reference to Islam and the Holy Qur’an . . . [a]ffirmed that that offensive reference should have been
excluded from the report . . . [and] [r]equested . . . the Special Rapporteur to take corrective action in
response.” Commission on Human Rights Res. 1997/125, Reps. of Commission on Human Rights, 53d
Sess., U.N. Doc E/CN.4/DEC/1997/125 (Apr. 18, 1997).
84 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 61st Meeting, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.61
(Oct. 19, 1999) (quoting Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan).
85 Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
86 Commission on Human Rights, Draft Resolution 1999/ . . . Defamation of Islam, at 2, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999). The Draft Resolution was submitted by Pakistan on behalf of members
of the OIC.
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religious intolerance to “continue to devote attention to attacks against Islam and attempts
to defame it.”87
¶26
In response to Pakistan’s draft, Western governments proposed amendments
to de-specify Islam and approach the challenge of discrimination from a more general
perspective inclusive of all religions.88 Subsequent Pakistani sub-amendments sought to
preserve specificity relating to “defamatory attacks against [Islam]”89 and stressed that
removing the resolution’s focus on Islam “would defeat the purpose of the text, which
was to bring a problem relating specifically to that religion to the attention of the
international community.”90 Following additional negotiations, a compromise resolution
emerged expressing concern over the stereotyping of all religions rather than Islam alone,
and which retained the term “defamation” in the resolution title only.91 The representative
from Pakistan hailed the OIC member states’ “considerable flexibility” in agreeing to a
compromise resolution.92 At the same time, Germany’s representative, speaking on behalf
of the European Union (EU), stressed the EU’s collective “wish to make it clear that they
did not attach any legal meaning to the term ‘defamation’ as used in the title.”93
¶27
This seemingly insignificant resolution served as defamation’s proverbial
foot in the door at the UN for two reasons: first, it tasked two UN special rapporteurs
with taking into account provisions of the resolution in future reports to the UNCHR; and
second, it expressed the UNCHR’s intent “to remain seized of the matter.”94
Consequently, the effort to install a prohibition on defamation of religion became
systematized and integrated not only into the UNCHR agenda, but also into the mandates
of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance and the Special Rapporteur on racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
¶28
Over the relatively short time span of 10 years, the UNCHR, its successor the
Human Rights Council (HRC), and even the UN General Assembly (U.N.G.A.)
proceeded to pass regular resolutions dedicated to combating “Defamation of Religion.”
A review of these resolutions demonstrates that invocation of the term “defamation”
skyrocketed, from a solitary reference in 1999, to 23 references in 2009. Furthermore,
placement of the term defamation within the resolution also shifted dramatically, from no
references within the body of the resolution, up to eight preambulatory references
coupled with eight additional operative references most recently in 2009.95 The repeated
87

Id.
Commission on Human Rights, Draft Resolution 1999/ . . . Amendment to draft resolution
E/CN.4/1999/L.40, ¶ 8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.90 (Apr. 22, 1999). The amendments were put forward by
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (joined by
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Norway and Poland).
89 Commission on Human Rights, Proposed sub-amendments to the amendments to draft resolution
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 contained in document E/CN.4/1999/L.90, ¶ 1, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.104 (April 28,
1999).
90 Summary Record, supra note 84, ¶ 8.
91 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1999/82, Defamation of Religions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/82
(Apr. 30, 1999). (Adopted without a vote).
92 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 62nd Meeting, [1999] para. 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 (Nov. 17, 1999).
93 Id., at ¶ 9.
94 UNHCR, Res. 1999/82, supra note 91, at ¶ 6.
95 Operative paragraphs of UN resolutions are typically action-oriented statements intended to create or
advance policy. In contrast, preambulary text is explanatory in purpose, and provides justifications for
88
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use of defamation in the operative clauses of these resolutions necessarily gives its
meaning new significance. To understand this significance, it is helpful to start with the
legal definition of defamation and explore the implications of efforts to graft this concept
onto protection of religion within the framework of international law.
B. Defining Defamation of Religion: Challenges to Existing Principles of Defamation
Law and International Human Rights Law
1. Understanding Defamation Law
¶29

Although specifics vary from state to state, defamation is classically defined
as the “act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third
person,”96 or as an intentional false communication that injures another person’s
reputation.97 From this, several important elements are obvious: first, the offense must be
directed at individuals (or in certain potential instances, at groups98) rather than at an
idea, concept, or set of beliefs; and second, if the statement is merely an opinion, rather
than an assertion of fact, a claim for defamation typically cannot be supported. In
addition to the existing common law defense of fair comment,99 under Australia’s unified
defamation law, a statutory defense to alleged defamation arises, inter alia, where the
defendant proves that:
(a) the matter was an expression of opinion of the defendant rather than a
statement of fact, and
(b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest, and
(c) the opinion is based on proper material.100

¶30

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the distinction between fact
and opinion remains relevant in establishing whether a defamation claim is actionable. In
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,101 the Court held communication in the form of an
opinion may be considered defamatory, but only if the statement of the opinion implies
that the speaker has knowledge of provably false (i.e. defamatory) but undisclosed
facts.102 In other words, the opinion may be defamatory only if it is premised on some
action undertaken in the resolution’s operative part. Data on file with the author. For a more detailed
treatment of how defamation of religion arrived at the U.N., see Blitt, supra note 80.
96 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
97 Special Rapporteur on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression, The
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/55
(Dec. 30, 2005). This applies to individuals and corporations alike.
98 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to
endorse the notion of group libel claims. However, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has observed
that “cases decided since Beauharnais…have substantially undercut this support. To the extent that
Beauharnais can be read as endorsing group libel claims, it has been so weakened by subsequent cases
such as New York Times that the Seventh Circuit has stated that these cases ‘had so washed away the
foundations of Beauharnais that it cannot be considered authoritative’…We agree with the Seventh Circuit
that the permissibility of group libel claims is highly questionable at best.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine
Inc. 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. App. 1989).
99 David Rolph, A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws 16.3 TORTS L.J. 207, 237 (2008).
100 Defamation Act, 2005, § 31.1 (N.S.W.).
101 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
102 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977).
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precursory and provably false statement of fact. However, the plaintiff must still show
that the false implications of the communication were made with some level of fault to
support recovery. As this practice indicates, a showing of intent may be required in
certain instances.
¶31
Although the decision in Milkovich represented a more nuanced elaboration
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, it preserved the core
principle that “there is no such thing as a false idea” under the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.103 Moreover, Milkovich reaffirmed that statements which could not
“reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts” about an individual would fail to
satisfy the test for defamation.104 In the majority’s view, this protection served as
“assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the
‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our
Nation.”105
2. Enforcing a Prohibition on Defamation of Religion: Definitional and Legal
Impediments
¶32

With this overview in mind, the problem of relying on defamation as a legal
framework for protecting religion becomes evident. First, enforcement of and limitations
on defamation vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, making it virtually impossible to
extract clear, consistent rules regarding its application to individuals. Beyond this,
applying defamation to various systems of belief that come with their own sets of unique
but improvable truth claims further complicates the effort. These claims often may be
directly at odds with the competing claims of another religious group. Indeed, the latter
group may even consider such rival views “defamatory.” However, because these
scenarios do not deal in provable statements of fact, defamation law cannot effectively
address them. The problem of providing a workable definition of “defamation of
religion” is so apparent that after ten years of passing resolutions, neither the HRC nor
the U.N.G.A. has ventured to undertake the task.106
¶33
The conceptual challenge of defamation of religion is exacerbated further
when considering the nature and purpose of international human rights law. To begin,
international human rights law, and specifically the right to freedom of religion or belief,
“does not include the right to have a religion or belief that is free from criticism or
ridicule.”107 This same body of law also recognizes individuals’ right to freedom of
expression; and while that right may be limited in certain narrowly tailored contexts, hurt
feelings alone do not rise to the level of a violation of rights that would justify such a
limitation.108 Recognizing such a limitation under international human rights law would
103

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
Milkovich, supra note 101, at 2706.
105 Id. at 2697.
106 Instead, there is a new emphasis on blurring the boundary between defamation and the concept of
incitement. See Part III(B)(3).
107 Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief and on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (20 Sept. 2006) (by Asma
Jahangir & Doudou Diène). [hereinafter Jahangir & Diène].
108 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19.3, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Restrictions must be provided by law, and be necessary: (a) For respect of the
rights or reputations of others; [and] (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
104
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entail nothing less than a reordering of rights resulting in the censoring of free expression
by limiting “scholarship on religious issues and…[by] asphyxiat[ing] honest debate or
research.”109
¶34
This reordering would also undermine freedom of religion, the very right
supporters of outlawing defamation argue requires greater protection. The history
associated with protecting religious freedom is intimately tied to the protection of
minority rights.110 However, blasphemy charges typically are used to stifle the freedom of
religion or belief of minority groups disfavored by the dominant faith. Granting the
charge of defamation an international imprimatur allows it to be used not as a shield, but
rather as a sword to silence those deemed to have religious or political beliefs at odds
with the faith supported by the ruling party. Perhaps in response to this risk, the UN
Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts tasked with interpreting the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
monitoring its implementation,111 concluded almost twenty years ago that:
If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes,
proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not
result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 [freedom of
thought, conscience and religion] or any other rights recognized under the
Covenant nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the
official ideology or who oppose it.112
Further, establishing defamation of religion as a legitimate basis for suppressing speech
would essentially ascribe greater priority to the protection of a set of ideas rather than to
individuals, an outcome antithetical to the very impetus for international human rights
law.113
¶35
Despite these red flags – and in contradiction to the recommendations of at
least one UN special rapporteur at the time – the HRC and the U.N.G.A. in 2007
proceeded with efforts to modify the longstanding consensus surrounding human rights
norms. In similar resolutions, both UN bodies asserted
… that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which should be
exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as
provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of
public), or of public health or morals.”).
109 Jahangir & Diène, supra note 107, at ¶ 42.
110 See, e.g., Little Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 (the 1919 treaty between Poland and the League of
Nations addressing minority rights in the newly created Polish state).
111 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights
Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
112 OHCHR, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion. Art.
18, ¶ 10 (July 30, 1993).
113 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948) (“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people.”).
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others, protection of national security or of public order, public health or
morals and respect for religions and beliefs.114
¶36

This language signals surreptitious efforts by the U.N.G.A. and the HRC—
the body “responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe”115—to amend the longstanding legal consensus enshrined under the
ICCPR. Using the limitations agreed upon in ICCPR article 19 as a jumping-off point,
both resolutions unilaterally add a limitation on the right of freedom of expression,
namely “respect for religions and beliefs.” In other words, in the minds of the voting
majorities within the U.N.G.A. and HRC, speech labeled defamatory (or blasphemous) of
religion is no longer worthy of protection, regardless of contrary views expressed by the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief or in the ICCPR text.
¶37
The steady effort on the part of OIC member states to entrench defamation of
religion as an international norm again bore fruit in 2008, when the U.N.G.A. passed a
similar resolution, calling, inter alia, for increased restrictions on freedom of
expression.116 During voting in the Third Committee on the draft resolution submitted by
Pakistan (again acting on behalf of OIC member states),117 the European Union
maintained its position that “[it] did not see the concept of defamation of religions as
valid in a human rights discourse; international human rights law protected primarily
individuals, rather than religions as such, and religions or beliefs in most States did not
enjoy legal personality.”118
3. Which Way Forward: Defamation of Religion as Customary International Law or as a
Form of Incitement?

¶38

Although some states continue to claim that “defamation of religion” is an
unworkable chimera, consistent majorities in the HRC and U.N.G.A. beg to differ. And
yet, despite this majority, U.N.G.A. resolutions are arguably only a representation of that
body’s opinion and therefore not legally binding. In accordance with the UN Charter, the
U.N.G.A is not intended to serve as a legislative body:

114

See G.A. Res. 61/164, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2007); see also Human Rights Council
Res. 4/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/4/9/ (30 March 2007). (The vote in the General Assembly was 111 votes
to 54, with 18 abstentions. In the Council, the recorded vote was 24 to 14 with nine abstentions).
115 OHCHR: The Human Rights Council, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/ (last visited
Oct. 12, 2010).
116 G.A. Res. 62/154, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Mar. 6, 2008) (The resolution passed with a recorded
vote of 108 to 51, with 25 abstentions). See also G.A. Res. 10678 (X), U.N. Doc.GA/10678 (Dec. 18,
2007).
117 Pakistan, “Combating Defamation of Religions” (draft resolution), UN Doc. A/C.3/62/L.35, Nov. 2,
2007. Subsequently, Belarus and Venezuela joined in sponsoring the draft resolution. Report of the Third
Committee, “Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative
approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” UN Doc.
A/62/439/Add.2. The Third Committee endorsed the draft by a vote of 95 in favor to 52 against, with 30
abstentions. For the voting record, see Annex III, UN Department of Public Information, Third Committee
Approves Three Country-Specific Texts On Human Rights: Despite Opposition Led By Developing
Countries, UN Doc. GA/SHC/3909, Nov. 20, 2007.
118 U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3909, supra note 117.
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The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of
any organs provided for in the present Charter, and … may make
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.119
However, it is also generally recognized that over time, U.N.G.A. resolutions may come
to reflect and have the binding force of customary international law. The classic example
of such practice is embodied in U.N.G.A. Resolution 217A (1948), more commonly
known as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).120 Over time, this
landmark Declaration has come to be acknowledged by a variety of authorities as
reflective of customary international law norms.121
¶39
Most recently at the end of 2009, the U.N.G.A. again endorsed a resolution
on combating defamation of religion.122 The resolution received a record sixty-one “no”
votes123 at the Assembly’s 64th session.124 Although the endorsement of a limitation on
freedom of expression based on “respect for religions and beliefs” was conspicuously
missing from the text,125 the resolution continued to express “deep concern” over “the
intensification of the overall campaign of the defamation of religions” despite offering
nothing to substantiate the finding.126
¶40
At this point, a growing rift between the Special Rapporteur on freedom of
expression, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and possibly the
119

U.N. Charter art. 10.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 113.
121 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d. Cir. App. 1980) (the prohibition against torture
“has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights…”); see also Hurst Hannum, The UDHR In National and International Law, vol. 3 no. 2
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 145 (Many of the Universal Declaration’s provisions also have become
incorporated into customary international law, which is binding on all states”). This evolution occurred
despite the fact that the UDHR’s drafters plainly intended it to have no legally binding effect on states. In
the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights tasked with drafting
the document, the UDHR “was not a treaty or international agreement and did not impose legal obligations;
it was rather a statement of basic principles of inalienable human rights setting up a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.” 1948 U.N.Y.B. 527, U.N. Sales No. 1950.I.II.
122 G.A. Res. 64/156, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Mar. 8, 2010). The “Combating defamation of religions”
resolution as passed in the Third Committee is referenced as UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II).
123 UN Department of Public Information, “General Assembly Adopts 56 Resolutions, 9 Decisions
Recommended by Third Committee on Broad Range of Human Rights, Social, Cultural Issues,” UN Doc.
GA/10905 (Dec. 18, 2009), .
124 The resolution (UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2, part II) was adopted by a recorded vote of 80 in favor to 61
against, with 42 abstentions. Voting in favor were OIC states, the Russian Federation, and China, together
with numerous African, Latin American, and Asian states. Australia, the United States, EU member states,
and others voted against the text. See Annex VIII, UN Doc. GA/10905, supra note 123. One could make
the case that the vote actually reflected a plurality rather than a majority since over 100 states either voted
against or abstained.
125 The provision is stricken from the paragraph addressing freedom of expression. It was also absent in
2008. See Para. 10, UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 122, and ¶ 10, UN General Assembly
Resolution, “Defamation of Religions,” UN Doc. A/RES/63/171, 24 March 2009 (emphasis added). Human
Rights Council, “Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of
traditional values of humankind,” UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/21, 12 October 2009. At the same time, the
HRC passed an equally ominous new resolution entitled “Promoting human rights and fundamental
freedom through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind.” Though some of the problems
raised by this resolution are related, they fall outside the immediate scope of this article.
126 UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 122.
120
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Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights on the one hand, and certain U.N.
member states on the other, has become evident.127 Most of the early reports prepared by
Doudou Diène, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, signal strident support for prohibiting
defamation of religion. For example, Diène urged “the Commission to invite the Special
Rapporteur to submit a regular report on all manifestations of defamation of religion,
stressing the strength and seriousness of Islamophobia at the present time.”128 In contrast,
Diène’s predecessor Abdelfattah Amor stressed early on that “very frequently,
prohibitions against acts of defamation or blasphemy are misused for the purposes of
outright censorship of the right to criticism and discussion of religion and related
questions,” and that in “many cases, defamation becomes the tool of extremists in
censoring and maintaining or propagating obscurantism.”129
¶41
Despite these sharp disagreements, a survey of the reporting by the U.N.
special rapporteurs and the OHCHR over ten years indicates a recent about-face away
from the defamation concept and in favor of addressing issues of concern through the
offense of incitement. This sea change in attitude is particularly evident in 2008, even in
Diène’s reporting. Although non-existent as a concern over nearly ten years, Diène
suddenly argues that “[w]ith a view to promoting this change of paradigm, translating
religious defamation from a sociological notion into a legal human rights concept,
namely incitement to racial and religious hatred,” will show “that combating incitement
to hatred is not a North-South ideological question but a reality present in a large
majority of national legislations in all regions.”130
¶42
This concerted effort to redirect the defamation debate away from its
sociological overtones in favor of a protection regime grounded in the more palatable –
and arguably legally definable – notion of incitement finds dramatic expression in a joint
statement released by three special rapporteurs during the 2009 Durban Review
Conference. Oddly, however, this important document lacks an official U.N. Document
number and is virtually buried on the UN’s website.131 According to the special
127 The U.S. described the voting over the most recent defamation resolution as evidencing an “increasingly
splintered view” within the General Assembly. UN Department of Public Information, “Third Committee
Approves Resolution Aimed at ‘Combating Defamation of Religions’, One of 16 Draft Texts
Recommended to General Assembly,” UN Doc. GA/SHC/3966 (Nov. 12, 2009).
128Report by Mr. Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ¶ 37, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/17 (Feb. 13, 2006).
129Interim report by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, ¶ 97, UN Doc. A/55/280 (Sept. 8,
2000). Still Amor also maintained that the issue of defamation reflected one of his “major
concerns…because it is an intrinsic violation of the freedom of religion or belief.” Report submitted by Mr.
Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, ¶ 137, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63
(Jan. 16, 2004).
130 Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 45, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/12 (Sept. 2,
2008).
131 Joint statement by Mr. Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance; Ms. Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Religion or Belief; and Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious
Hatred, OHCHR side event during the Durban Review Conference, Geneva, 1 (April 22, 2009),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/docs/Joint_Statement_SRs.pdf. Searching for
“Joint statement of three special rapporteurs on incitement to racial or religious hatred” returns only two
results from http://search.ohchr.org and http://www.google.com alike. Searching for “Freedom of
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rapporteurs who endorsed this statement, the concept of defamation of religion suffers
from significant underlying problems:
[T]he difficulties in providing an objective definition of the term
“defamation of religions” at the international level make the whole
concept open to abuse. At the national level, domestic blasphemy laws can
prove counter-productive, since this could result in the de facto censure of
all inter-religious and intra-religious criticism. Many of these laws afford
different levels of protection to different religions and have often proved
to be applied in a discriminatory manner. There are numerous examples of
persecution of religious minorities or dissenters, but also of atheists and
non-theists, as a result of legislation on religious offences or overzealous
application of laws that are fairly neutral.132
¶43

Even as certain individual and institutional voices have begun endorsing this
position, it remains likely that the debate will continue to spill over to future U.N.G.A.
sessions. The reality remains that a majority of states at the UN continue to favor
promulgating a new norm prohibiting defamation of religion, even if means fitting it in
under a more consensual rubric of incitement. As Masood Khan, Pakistan’s UN
ambassador, reminded the HRC in 2008, the ultimate objective of OIC member states is
nothing less than a “new instrument or convention” addressing defamation.133 The OIC
already considers defamation a legitimate and existing norm: “The succession of
U.N.G.A. and UNHRC [UN Human Rights Council] resolutions on the defamation of
religions makes it a standalone concept with international legitimacy.”134
¶44
In light of these views, the paradigm shift advocated by the special
rapporteurs remains uncertain at best. Even if the U.N.G.A. and the HRC drop the effort
to entrench a norm built around the specific language of defamation, there is little
indication that a compromise based on “incitement to religious hatred” would function
any differently in practice. In other words, OIC member states and other governments
may still invoke the incitement model to establish a justification under international law
for outlawing speech, religious practice, and other actions deemed blasphemous. It is
worthwhile to recall here that support for a defamation of religion norm transcends OIC
member states. Countries such as Russia and China continue to be strong proponents of
the norm. For example, the former Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch, Alexy II, latched
onto the concept of defamation of religion as a basis for building Christian-Muslim
cooperation: “In the framework of international organizations, it seems useful to create
mechanisms that make it possible to be more sensitive to the spiritual and cultural
traditions of various peoples.”135
Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred” returns eight hits, four of which are UN-based
websites. The document can also be accessed from
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/index.htm.
132 Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred, supra note 131, at ¶ 2.
133 Steven Edwards, UN anti-blasphemy measures have sinister goals, observers say, CANWEST NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440fa5de-6ff6e78c78d5.
134 2nd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, June 2008 to April 2009, issued at the 36th council of
foreign ministers, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, May 23-25, 2009, 4 (emphasis added).
135 “Response from His Holiness Patriarchy Alexy II of Moscow and all Russia [to the open letter of 138
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IV. DEFAMATION OF RELIGION AND DRAFTING AUSTRALIA’S BILL OF RIGHTS
¶45

In the immediate context of ongoing efforts to better protect and promote
human rights in Australia, through the development of a bill of rights,136 the issue of
defamation of religion merits consideration for a number of reasons. First, accounting for
current international human rights debates in any final instrument may better position that
document to meet potential future challenges. For example, by exploring the issue of
defamation, drafters of a bill of rights can address the scope and priority to be assigned to
freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief, including what limitations may
be applicable and when. Such a step can be a useful part of the process of determining
where Australia wants to situate itself and its citizens vis à vis emerging human rights
norms. This approach is also in sync with the Australian Human Rights Consultation
Committee’s finding that “newly emerging rights in international law – such as the right
to a clean and sustainable environment – are constantly in the Australian public’s
gaze.”137 In other words, Australians favor an open-minded and exploratory approach that
enables consideration of unsettled questions related to rights. Such an approach should
necessarily consider lex lata, but also lex ferenda and other sources of potential norms
that offer a more expansive interpretation of emerging human rights principles.
¶46
Second, a robust upfront discussion on defamation of religion can help
resolve potential inconsistencies between Australian foreign policy and national law. This
is particularly important given Australia’s ambivalent position regarding the protection of
religion under defamation-based offenses. Although Australia’s international voting
record at the UN reveals a national distaste for defamation of religion resolutions,
domestic legislative initiatives indicate the possibility of allowing prosecution of such
offenses in the name of fostering tolerance. For example, Victoria’s controversial Racial
and Religious Tolerance Act (“the Act”) specifically prohibits “conduct that incites
hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule” of persons “on the
ground of religious belief or activity.”138 The Act also provides various exceptions,
including where conduct of the accused is deemed to have occurred reasonably and in
good faith:
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made
or held, or any other conduct engaged in, for –
(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious139 or scientific purpose; or
(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or
(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or
matter of public interest.140

Muslim Theologians],” April 18, 2008, http://acommonword.com/en/a-common-word/6-christianresponses/202-response-from-his-holiness-patriarchy-alexy-ii-of-moscow-and-all-russia.html.
136
This is in fact one of the objectives of Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation process. See
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Terms_of_Reference.
137 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at 346.
138 Art. 8, Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, No. 47 of 2001 (Version No. 006), incorporating
amendments as at 1 October 2009.
139 An amendment added in 2006 provides that “a religious purpose includes, but is not limited to,
conveying or teaching a religion or proselytizing.” Id. Art. 11(2).
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Disturbingly, the Act renders motive irrelevant in determining whether an
offense has occurred141 and boasts an extra-territorial effect covering conduct that may
have transpired outside of Victoria proper.142 Nevertheless, it would appear that the law
does not afford protection to religious beliefs per se, but rather only to adherents as
individuals or as a class of persons. In Fletcher v. Salvation Army Australia, the
administrative tribunal found that the Act:
is not concerned with the vilification of a religious belief or activity as
such. Rather it is concerned with the vilification of a person, or a class of
persons, on the ground of the religious belief or activity of the person or
class … The law does not stop a person from engaging in conduct that
involves contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a religious belief or activity,
provided this does not incite hatred against, serious contempt for, or
revulsion or severe ridicule of another person or a class of persons on the
ground of such belief or activity. The law recognises that you can hate the
idea without hating the person.143

¶48

Beyond this, other constituencies in Australia have expressed support for a
prohibition on defamation of religion. During a government-sponsored inquiry into
revising the existing law on blasphemy in NSW,144 the New South Wales Council of
Churches (NSWCC) offered detailed submissions in favor of a new codification of the
offense of blasphemy. As part of this re-codification effort, the NSWCC expressed
support for retaining the offense but replacing the term “blasphemy” with either
“religious vilification” or “religious defamation,” labels the NSWCC argued would avoid
any misunderstanding or misconstruing of the offense while preserving its essence
(namely, the prohibition of criticism of religious beliefs and symbols).145 Drafters of any
bill of rights should be cognizant of such domestic expressions of support for retaining a
blasphemy offense for two reasons: first, they mirror efforts on the international level to
package an old offense in new, less “offensive” terms; and second, because such
supporters still deserve a thoughtful explanation as to why reviving blasphemy may be at
odds with other rights and values contemplated as worthy of protection under any future
rights instrument.
¶49
Therefore, the importance of having drafters clarify Australia’s position
cannot be overstated. This becomes particularly evident when considering the emerging
law in Ireland. Like Australia, Ireland has consistently voted against defamation of
religion resolutions at the UN. Following the December 2008 vote on “Combating
Defamation of Religion,” Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin,
explained:

140

Id. at Art. 11(1). Article 12 addresses exceptions for private conduct, “in circumstances that may
reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to the conduct desire it to be heard or seen only by
themselves.”
141 Id. Art. 9(1).
142 Id. Art. 8(2)(b).
143 Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia (Anti Discrimination) [2005] VCAT 1523, ¶ 7 (1 August 2005).
144 For a discussion of the Commission’s findings, see Part II(a) above.
145 NSW Blasphemy Report, supra note 33, ¶ 4.40.
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We believe that the concept of defamation of religion is not consistent
with the promotion and protection of human rights. It can be used to
justify arbitrary limitations on, or the denial of, freedom of expression.
Indeed, Ireland considers that freedom of expression is a key and inherent
element in the manifestation of freedom of thought and conscience and as
such is complementary to freedom of religion or belief.146
¶50

However, Ireland’s constitution has long provided that the “publication or
utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be
punishable in accordance with law.”147 To this end, a 2009 law enacted by the
Oireachtas148 has made it a fineable offense for anyone to publish or utter “blasphemous
matter.”149 Under the new law, in force since January 2010, a blasphemous
communication “is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any
religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that
religion.”150
¶51
Unlike Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, the Irish law
establishes a mens rea threshold: prosecutors must demonstrate the accused intended “by
the publication or utterance of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.”151 The law
also affords a defense to the charges if the defendant can prove “that a reasonable person
would find genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic value in the matter
to which the offence relates.”152 However, these grounds are arguably narrower than
Victoria’s since no reference is made to the legitimacy of religious or public interest
purposes. More problematic still, Ireland’s law explicitly protects “matters held sacred by
any religion.” It therefore appears to track more closely with the push to outlaw
defamation of religion at the UN, giving rise to an apparent inconsistency – if not outright
conflict – between the law itself and statements of Foreign Affairs Minister Martin. As it
stands, Ireland’s Defamation Act potentially may run afoul of that country’s obligations
under international law and the European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, at least
one group has already taken steps to challenge the legality of the Irish law’s provisions

146

New Blasphemy Laws—Free Speech is Not Up For Discussion, IRISH EXAMINER, May 1, 2009,
http://www.examiner.ie/opinion/editorial/new-blasphemy-laws--free-speech-is-not-up-for-discussion90664.
147
Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40.
148
A strict time limit, known as a guillotine, was imposed on the debate in the Dáil. Following the lower
house vote, Ireland’s Seanad passed the bill in a nail-biting 23-22 vote, with the Green Party voting in
favor. Libel law revisions pass the Dáil, July 8, 2009, http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0708/libel.html.
Stephen Collins, Defamation Bill stumbles through Seanad after lost vote, IRISH TIMES, Jul. 10, 2009,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0710/1224250388598.html.
149 Art. 36(1), Defamation Bill 2006. A fine may run up to €25,000. Prior drafts of the law originally called
for a maximum €100,000 fine for the offense.
150 Id. Art. 36(2)(a).
151 Id. Art. 36(2)(b).
152 Id. Art. 36(3).
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on “blasphemous matter,”153 and there is some speculation that the government will hold
a public referendum to address the issue.154
¶52
By encouraging the drafters of Australia’s bill of rights to confront questions
related to religious defamation and vilification directly, potential inconsistencies in law
and foreign policy similar to those arising in Ireland may be avoided. There is already
some guidance on this issue emerging from the Australian judiciary, including expression
of a narrow definition of incitement,155 as well as a directive to avoid conflating hatred of
a given belief and hatred of adherents of that belief in the legal context. In Catch the Fire
Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria, the Victoria Court of Appeal found that the
lower tribunal failed to consider that distinction, and held that the Racial and Religious
Tolerance Act does not “purport to mandate religious tolerance.”156 According to the
Court, the Act “goes no further in restricting freedom to criticise the religious beliefs of
others than to prohibit criticism so extreme as to incite hatred or other relevant emotion
of or towards those others. It is essential to keep the distinction between the hatred of
beliefs and the hatred of their adherents steadily in view.”157
¶53
Finally, even if the drafters of an Australian bill of rights reject the
defamation norm currently espoused by a majority of UN member states, the process of
reaching this decision will help establish the legal justifications for such a position.
Within the context of a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed norm, this would
position the bill of rights to address, either head-on or implicitly, any possible future gaps
or inconsistencies between international human rights law and Australia’s domestic
implementation of rights. Similarly, in the event defamation of religion is confirmed as a
customary international law norm, Australia will be able to point to its internal bill of
rights debate as evidence of its status as a persistent objector opposed to such a norm. In
short, drafters can enshrine a more long-term vision of which rights are germane to
Australia and how these rights will operate by evaluating not only norms expressed in the
relevant treaty law, but also the emerging and potential norms on or just beyond the
horizon. This process would also have the benefit of strengthening Australia’s prestige on
the international level by “limit[ing] future criticism for non-compliance [and]
bolster[ing] Australia’s credibility when [it comments] on human rights abuses in other
jurisdictions.”158
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For example, an Irish atheist group published a series of “blasphemous” quotations by personalities
including Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Mark Twain, Salman Rushdie and Bjork in an effort to challenge the
law in court. CNN, Irish Atheists Use Bjork, Mark Twain to Challenge Blasphemy Law,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/01/02/ireland.blasphemy.law/index.html.
154 Compare Michael O’Regan, Now Not the Time For Referendum on Blasphemy, Says Ahern, THE IRISH
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0326/1224267097750.html, with
Henry McDonald, Ireland to Hold Referendum on Blasphemy Law, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Mar. 15, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/15/ireland-referendum-blasphemy-law.
155 For example, in Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia, the tribunal focused on the meaning of “incite”
under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act: “In its context, this does not mean ‘causes.’ Rather it carries
the connotation of ‘inflame’ or ‘set alight’. The section is not concerned with conduct that provokes
thought.” Fletcher v. Salvation Army, supra note 143, at ¶ 5.
156 Catch the Fire Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284, ¶ 34.
157 Id.
158 Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation Report has observed that passage of a Human Rights
Act would result in improved international standing for Australia. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 11, at xxv.
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V. CONCLUSION
¶54

This article has argued that there is much value and benefit to opening the
drafting process surrounding a bill of rights to outside ideas and comparative data.
Beyond increasing awareness and challenging preconceptions, such an approach provides
a more robust and grounded domestic debate, and can facilitate an outcome that provides
reasons and justifications for decisions. Taken together, these measures ultimately can
help establish the foundation for fewer surprises down the road.
¶55
As the last Western democracy without some form of a bill of rights,
Australia finds itself in an awkward, but potentially enviable, position. On the one hand,
its citizens lack a clear understanding and expression of their rights and freedoms,159 and
the country itself risks being isolated from developments in similar legal systems and
may suffer diminished stature during human rights discussions within international
fora.160 On the other hand, standing at the threshold of a decision to draft a genuinely
Australian human rights instrument holds significant promise: to empower citizens
through a participatory drafting model, meaningfully engage with a body of international
law that has advanced dramatically in the short span of sixty years, and create a document
that not only adopts existing minimum standards, but also contemplates and accounts for
emerging human rights norms. Based on Australia’s long history of support for
international human rights and the findings of the National Human Rights Commission, it
is evident that Australians will not settle for an instrument that merely reflects the floor
without consideration of the ceiling as well.
¶56
In the context of defamation of religion, it is clear that a majority of UN
member states support greater protection of religious symbols and beliefs, even if it
comes at the expense of freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion or belief. This emerging norm – regardless of whether it is labeled “defamation
of religion” or “incitement to religious hatred” – is part of an ongoing debate over the
substance of international human rights. Therefore, it should figure in any future
deliberations over the content and scope of rights in Australia. By recognizing this issue
and accounting for it during the drafting process, Australians can measure their vision of
domestic rights against the one emerging on the international level and, if disparities
arise, provide the necessary justifications in advance rather than post facto.
¶57
To be certain, the concept of defamation of religion is fraught with
difficulties. However, navigating through these difficulties will ensure an open and
participatory process, shine greater light on Australia’s national values and identity, and
result in a more durable final instrument capable of addressing future challenges.
Undertaking this exercise has the added benefits of helping to flesh out and test more
general positions relating to issues including balancing of rights and limitations, and of
clarifying potential inconsistencies in Australia’s domestic law and foreign policy.
Importantly, these advantages should be reproducible regarding assessments of other
similarly emerging norms drafters may choose to investigate in the future.

159

The National Human Rights Consultation Committee “found a lack of understanding among Australians
of what human rights are.” Id., at xvii.
160 Id., at xxv.

